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Draft: Sunday, 25 October 2009
Introduction
In August 2006 the m.v. Probo Koala, chartered by the oil company
Trafigura, transferred 500 tonnes of what Trafigura describe as
"slops", which were in fact waste products from the
processing of coker naphtha at sea, to a newly set up Ivorian
disposal company, Compagnie Tommee, who discharged the waste to
landfill and water courses around the town of Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire..
The port of Amsterdam had earlier required that a costly cleaning
process should be applied to the cargo, which Trafigura was not
willing to pay.
Up to 100,000 people in the town reacted to the foul smell of
the dumped waste. There were 30,000 medical consultations, with
headaches, nausea, skin burns and respiratory tract irritation
being common presentations.
Up to 17 deaths were claimed to be associated with the event.
Trafigura have paid US $198 million to the Ivorian government
for a cleanup operation, and £30 million to the victims
of the incident. Both payments were out-of-court settlements,
and the company denies any causal relationship between its "slops"
and any symptoms beyond transient flu-like illness.
The Minton
Report was commissioned by Trafigura on 7 Sept 2009 and delivered
on the 14th September. They were asked to assess the potential
toxicity of the discharge.
In the conclusions they write:
9.3 The compounds ... are capable of causing severe human health
effects through inhalation and ingestion. These include headaches,
breathing difficulties, nausea, eye irritation, skin ulceration,
unconsciousness and death. There would also be a strong and unpleasant
odour over a large area. All of these effects were as reported
in this incident.
Trafigura claim that this report was a mere draft. However, it
is not presented as such. It concludes with the line:
This report was prepared prior to the arrival of documents
providing details of events at the discharge and will be updated
in due course.
Trafgura tried unsuccessfully to stifle reporting of their report,
using the English libel
laws and the notorious libel lawyers Carter-Ruck to place
a super-injunction on the Guardian Newspaper from reporting a
Parliamentary question on the Minton Report. A super-injunction
is one that not only commands the hiding of information, but also
hid the fact that an injunction had been issued*. This draconian
attack on public interest knowledge was overthrown by social media
activity on the internet.
As well as the abortive attempt through Carter-Ruck to gag reportage
on Parliament, Trafigura are also suing BBC Newsnight for alleging
that they caused illness. They have tried, or may try to, gag
media sources in the Netherlands and Norway. On the other hand,
Greenpeace Netherlands may sue Trafigura, and the EU Environment
Commissioner, Stavros Dimas, stated that EU law had been broken
by Trafigura. Remarkably, they also threatened to sue Martyn Day,
the solicitor in the class action against Trafigura, for claiming
that they caused illness.
Trafigura claims that the evidence of more than 20 independent
experts shows that their "slops" could not have caused
the observed illness. This evidence has no scientific status since
it is not available for the scientific community to examine.
The central question for scientists is this:
Did Trafigura's toxic waste discharged around Abidjan in 2006
cause the illnesses claimed by the local people?
Trafigura claim not, but their claim has no scientific basis,
because the evidence they claim proves no-effect is not open to
access by medical and scientific investigators.
It is always difficult to make a causal link between an environmental
toxin and associated ill-health.
The usual point in the case advanced by the polluter is that
"There is no proof that toxin X brought about health effect
Y". This is disingenuous, because, contrary to popular belief,
there is no such thing as "proof" in science. According
to Popper, the doyen of the philosophy of science, the best that
a scientific hypothesis can achieve is "not yet dispoven".
Two years after the event, when the toxins have been neutralised,
cleaned up and dissipated, it is going to be even harder to establish
causality. Nevertheless, given the political will and the resources,
it is still possible to design a trial to test Trafigura's hypothesis
that there is no persistent health effect from their "slops".
The Design of a Trial to test the Trafigura hypothesis
Trafigura's hypothesis of no lasting damage predicts that nobody
that was in contact with the airborne or water borne pollution
has any persisting symptoms, signs, or evidence of change in their
medical status two or more years after the pollution event. Trafigura's
lawyers will probably imply that any persistent symptoms are functional,
that is, manifestations of anxiety, conversion disorder, or profit-driven
malingering.
This hypothesis can be tested in the following way:
1) Assemble two cohorts of people: one composed of those who
believe that they have been affected by the Trafigura dump, and
a control group, of similar ethnicity and socio-economic standing,
but who were not exposed to the dump.
2) Collect and collate the history, (including the extent of
exposure), symptoms, signs and special investigations in both
groups.
- Symptoms can be registered on a questionnaire.
- Signs will be through physical examination. We will be looking
primarily for current skin lesions or scarring, and at respiratory
tract function.
- Investigation will consist of:
Blood tests: FBC and film, Viscosity or ESR, TFT, LFT, yGT, Electrolytes,
AutoImmune profile, Immunoglobulin electrophoresis, Calcium, Glucose,
and any other tests which toxicologists may suggest.
Respiratory tests on any who claim respiratory symptoms or have
chest signs: Peak Flow, and Spirometry.
Biopsy of skin lesions.
Any other appropriate investigations suggested by earlier findings.
3) Analyse the data. It is probable that three groups will emerge:
the control group, a group showing physical changes, and a third
group who have "subjective" illness, but no objective
changes, apart from a lowered free calcium level associated with
hyperventilation.
4) A further test can be carried out on the groups. A sample of
them can, with permission, be challenged with a reconstructed
mixture of the toxins that they met in 2006. This would entail
reconstructing a mixture of the Probo Koala's waste, as best we
can from the records and our knowledge of the coker naphtha process,
and reacting it in a laboratory with the kind of liquids and solids
that are found typically in the waste tips around Abidjan. The
FBC, film, immunoglobulin profile and viscosity, and other relevant
immunological parameters in both experimental groups will be measured
before and after the challenge.
The causal hypothesis predicts that the physically affected group
will show a change in the markers, while the controls and "subjective
illness" group will have no such reaction, or a different
reaction.
5) The data can be analysed, and Bradford Hill's criteria applied
to the results, so far as is possible.
Funding
Clearly, this trial would be a major undertaking, costing a few
millions of pounds, and is well beyond the reach of the government
of the Cote d'Ivoire, or of NGOs. However, Trafigura has shown
itself ready to make "ex gratia" payments already, and
may be prepared to provide funds, which can be accepted provided
that they are on an arms'-length basis. An alternative source
of funding would be Trafigura's insurance company, since they
must have corporate insurance to cover this eventuality.
Conclusion
The scientific approach to the question of whether Trafigura's
2006 dump of waste in Abidjan had an adverse effect on the health
of local people involves a careful survey of the current health
of the exposed population, compared with a similar number of non-exposed
people. This survey should be paid for at arms length by Trafigura's
insurers.
© Richard Lawson
rlawson@gn.apc.org
Sunday, 25 October 2009
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